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LAWLESS LAW ENFORCEMENT
If you ever go to Houston, man, you'd better walk right,
And you'd better not stagger and you'd better not fight,
'Cause the sheriff will arrest you, he's gonna take you down,
1
You can bet your bottom dollar, you're penitentiary bound.
I.

THE PROBLEM

The issue which this comment will consider was of concern to Mr. Justice
Brandeis in 1928. He stated: "to declare that in the administration of the
criminal law the end justifies the means, to declare that the government
may unconstitutionally deprive citizens of any race of their equal rights
with others, would be the most pernicious doctrine the Supreme Court could
adopt". 2 The Justice was referring to the unfortunate practice of lawless
law enforcement.
The legal dilemma posed by police malpractice is too great in dimension to
be covered adequately here. The present comment will, then, be limited
to the question of whether the legal system can effectively cope with the
problem of police discrimination and brutality in the Black community. 3
Specifically, the authors will direct themselves to a discussion of the remedies
which are currently employed to redress grievances of alleged police discrimination and brutality. Further, a proposal will be made for the solution
of the problem through an effective use of the class action as well as through
legislative revisions.
The problem of police misconduct in the minority Black community,
although well publicized by the popular media, should be defined. Police
misconduct, or lawless law enforcement, is assumed first to include instances of illegal searches, verbal abuse, and physical coercion against
residents of the Black community. The problem entails the deprivation
of Black citizens' constitutionally guaranteed rights by the police. Finally, the problem includes police intimidation, violence, threats and insults
toward the victimized Black community.
It has always been difficult to document specific acts of police malpractice. 4 The reasons for this difficulty become apparent upon an examination of the problem. First, "the vast majority of police transgressions are
I From the Negro folk song The Midnight Special, quoted in A. GiNGER & L. BELL,
Police Misconduct Litigation-Plaintiff'sRemedies, 15 AM. Jun. TRiALs 555, 711 (1968).

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
3 For a corollary discussion on trial conduct and technique see GINGER & BELL,
supra note 1.
4 "There [probably] are many unlawful searches of homes and automobiles of
innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made, about
which courts do nothing, and about which we never hear." Brinegar v. United States,
2

338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949)

(Jackson, J., dissenting), quoted in Comment, The Federal
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acts of harassment and . . [brutality] which never lead to prosecutions. ' '5 Consequently, such acts of harassment and intimidation are less
likely to reach the courts or the public view. As Justice Jackson noted more
than 20 years ago in Brinegarv. United States:;
Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the attention of the courts, and
then only those where search and seizure yields incriminating evidence and the
defendant is sufficiently compromised to be indicted. 7

Police harassment has become a fact of daily life for a substantial minority
of Americans. In recent years there have been some revealing studies,
conducted on the national level, regarding police malpractice.
The import of the police malpractice problem was well emphasized in a
statement of the National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders in 1968:
We have cited deep hostility between police and ghetto communities as a primary
cause of the disorders surveyed by the Commission. In Newark, in Detroit, in
Watts, in Harlem-in practically every city that has experienced racial disruption
since 1964-abrasive relationships between police and Negroes . . . have been a
major source of grievance, tension and, ultimately, disorder.
In nearly every- city surveyed, the Commission heard complaints of harassment of interracial couples, dispersal of social gatherings, and the stopping of Negroes on foot or in cars without obvious basis. These, together with contemptuous
and degrading verbal abuse, have great impact in the ghetto. 8

The Committee concluded that :"police misconduct-whether described
as brutality, harassment, verbal abuse, or discourtesy-cannot be tolerated
even if it is infrequent. It contributes directly to the risk of civil disorder.
It is inconsistent with the basic responsibility and function of a police force
in a democracy." 9
The urgency of the need for a viable solution to the problem can be felt
in the introductory statement of the National Advisory Committee report: "This is our basic conclusion: Our nation is moving toward two
societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal. . . . To pursue
our present course will involve the continuing polarization of the American community and, ultimately, the destruction of basic democratic val0
ues."'
Police misconduct toward the Black community can be viewed as a
primary source of many of the political and social problems which today
Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 n.4
(1968). See P. JACOBS, PRELUDE TO RIOT (Vintage 1967); B. FLECKER, THE COMMUNITY AND RACIAL CRISES (1969).
5 Comment, supra note 4, at 143-44.
6 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
7 Id. at 181 (dissenting opinion); Comment, supra note 4, at 143 n.4.

8

REPORT OF NATIONAL ADvisoRy COMMISSION ON CwL DisoRDERs

1968).
9 Id. at 305.
10 Id. at 1.

299-303 (Bantam
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hold our society in sustained tension. Nothing less than the future of our
governmental system is being jeopardized by part of the public's lack of
faith in its police force. If that government is to survive, the legal system
on which it rests must provide remedies against police discrimination.
I.

CURRENT LEGAL REMEDIES

A.

Ineffective Remedies

1. Police Review Boards
The various metropolitan police review boards, extensively used in
nearly every major city to handle complaints of police malpractice from
its citizens, differ little from one another in composition and effectiveness. These boards are too often composed of and integrated with those
very police forces they were formed to survey.
This latter fact raises several ethical and pragmatic issues. Should the
police be allowed in fact to "police" themselves? Can police forces who
have a vested interest in their own perpetuation and public image in the
white community afford to even recognize, let alone remedy, Black citizens' complaints of police discrimination, brutality and intimidation?
How much impartiality can be realistically expected from a police commissioner who is required to mete out "justice" to both a police officer for
whom the commissioner is theoretically responsible and to a complainant?
From the standpoint of their effectiveness in easing police-community
tensions, the local review boards can be viewed generally as failures. A
letter from the McCone Commission to Governor Reagan of California
elaborated on part of the difficulties encountered with police review
boards:
A large number of policing contacts occur under circumstances which by their
nature have few or no independent witnesses, and complaints stemming from
such contacts are the most difficult to resolve, as the officer and the complainant
offer contradictory stories. When an investigation is unable to secure verifying
information, neither the complainant nor the accused police officer is able to obtain the satisfaction desired. 1"

Part of the reason for the failure of police review boards to effectively
respond to citizen complaints can be attributed to the self-interest of the
policemen serving on the boards. When police "police" themselves, complaints are either ignored or, more often, an impossible burden of proof is
placed on the complainant. As Deputy Chief Klug of Cincinnati said, "The
thing that bothers me is that police continue to receive huge numbers of complaints but there are only a few instances where the complainant is upheld.
11 See Letter from McCone Commission to Governor Ronald Reagan of California, August 18, 1967, at 31 (unpublished).
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They can't be wrong that much-and we can't be right that much.'

2

When

the police "refuse to account to the citizens they serve, when-in the name

of esprit de corps-they conceal their malpractice from the public review,
they compound the difficulties and dangers of their work while weakening
respect and support of the citizenry ... .
There are other factors which must be considered as causal in the ineffectiveness of police review boards. Two primary reasons for this failure
are the lack of finances and adequate personnel to properly administer the
boards. 14 With metropolitan populations of several million persons, the
budgets allocated for such boards to meaningfully deal with complaints would

approach astronomical figures.
It is important to consider whether changes could be made within the
present structure of police review boards which would increase their effectiveness. Affording complainants certain basic rights, more specifically, the
right of complainant to have an attorney present at a public hearing, the
right to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to require publishing of the

investigative report and board's decisions, would certainly foster greater
confidence in the board's ability to deal with problems. 15 However, the
problem of police discrimination would still exist even if review boards could
be made more effective. One method of remedying this situation is by the
creation of local boards which are made directly responsible to the members
of the community by whom they are elected.
12 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMNISTRATON OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 196 (U.S. Government Printing Office,

Wash. D.C., 1967), quoting Severo,.Today's Police Cast in the Role of an Enemy of
Society, The Washington Post, June 26, 1966, § A, at 6, cols. 1, 2, 3.
13 INSTITUTE OF MODERN LEGAL THOUGHT 13 (1969).
Therein an analysis of
complaint statistics is made. It is declared that the Los Angeles Police Department

contends that its investigation and decisions regarding complaints against the police are
not unduly prejudiced and are, in fact, evenhanded. The police support their statement
with statistics illustrating that the board sustains 40-45% of all complaints. More
specifically, in 1966, the Los Angeles.Police Department sustained 415 of 953 complaints; in 1967, 391 complaints were sustained out of a total of 1,016. However, a
closer analysis of such allegations reveals a more realistic picture. Complaints fall into
two categories, namely, civilian complaints for excessive force and complaints from
police department heads for neglect of duty. In 1967, there were 369 complaints for
excessive force yet. only 42 of them were sustained. This equals 11.4% of the total.
On the other hand, of 241 complaints for neglect of duty, 79.9% or 192 of these were
sustained. Of the total complaints received in 1967, only 10.7% of the complaints
sustained were for excessive force as compared to 49.5% sustained for neglect of duty.
These discrepancies are, at the least, noteworthy. Id. at 53-73. See also INTERNAL
AFFAIRS DIvISION, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, ANNUAL REPORT (1965-1967).
14 See Letter from McCone Commission to Governor Edmund G. Brown of California, August 17, 1966, at 4 (unpublished).
15 See TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE, supra note 12, at 197.
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Thus it is apparent that the inability of police review boards to alleviate
racial tensions and to effectively handle complaints suggests that an alternative
must be found to which the Black complainant can turn for redress of his
grievances.' 6 Judicial action, specifically individual suits, has been one
such alternative. In dealing with the issue of police discrimination against
the entire Black community, how effective or desirable are individual suits?
What, if anything, can be changed in the nature of such suits to improve
the legal remedy for the problem of lawless law enforcement?
2.

Individual Suits

17
Individual suits against police may be brought in state or federal courts.
In the past, particularly in the last three years, there have been several
cases concerning police misconduct. Often these cases have resulted in
substantial awards to complainants.' 8 To the extent that a monetary award
is sought, the individual suit will serve-the party seeking such redress. However, in Lankford v. Gelston' 9 the court noted that money damages do not
suffice to repair the injury of police misconduct. The court stated:

Neither the personal assets of policemen nor the nominal bonds they furnish
afford genuine hope of redress. Nor is there any provision for compensation
from public funds. In any event the wrongs inflicted are not readily measurable
in terms of dollars and cents. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has already
declared that the prospect of pecuniary redress for the harm suffered is 'worthless and futile.' Moreover the lesson of experience is that the remote possibility
of money damages serves as no deterrent to future police invasions. (emphasis
16

See section III infra.

17 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1964) adopts state wrongful death provisions as well as any

other state remedy necessary to the full vindication of civil rights. Brazier v. Cherry,
293 F.2d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 1961). It may be noted that jury rules in some state courts
may make use of federal jurisdiction more desirable. This may be true because according to some members of the bar, certain states systematically exclude Black
persons from their juries. See A. GINGER, Minimizing Racism in Jury Trials: The
Voir Dire Conducted by Charles R. Garry in People of Cal. v. Huey P. Newton, in
POLICE MATERIALS (Howard University Law School, Reginald Heber Smith Fellowship
Program, Summer 1970). Whether these charges are valid or not is not relevant
here. It should be noted, at the least, that "where a jury verdict of damages is sought
.. . the new Federal Jury Act of 1968 (part of 1968 Civil Rights Act) assures, if not
a perfectly representative jury panel, at least a far less racially exclusive one than in
the past." Id. at 87.
18 See Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1958) (upholding jury award of
$15,000.00 for beating and coerced confession); Roberts v. Williams, 302 F. Supp. 972
(N.D. Miss. 1969) (Negro prisoner blinded by shotgun blast due to sheriff's negligence
awarded $85,000.00); Rhoades v. Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967) (jury
award for 45 minutes false imprisonment with indignities but no physical abuse rereduced to $7,500.00).

See also POLICE MATERIALS, supra note 17.

19 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
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added) 20

Thus, individual suits fail to provide viable recourse for .broad patterns of
police misconduct.

Such suits are undesirable simply because they deal

only with a small aspect of remedial relief for police discrimination. Individual suits seek answers only to specific instances of police discrimination which have actually occurred. However, the problem is actually a
prospective one: individual suits do not alter the status quo; and, as stated
by the court in Lankford, police discrimination and misconduct against
the Black citizenry are not curbed by individual causes of action.
Excluding individual suits, then, are viable legal remedies still available
to complainants in the Black minority community?
B.

The Effectiveness of the Class Action
1.

Introduction

There are numerous legal remedies available under the United States
Constitution, Federal Civil Rights Act, and state law against police misconduct. Remedies provided are primarily suits for damages and injunctive
21
relief.
20 Id. at 202, citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128 (1954); and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
21 This outline was prepared by Don B. Kates, Jr., for a conference in Los
Angeles on November 21-25, 1970, sponsored by the Western Center on Law and
Poverty. Only changes in structure were made for its presentation herein.
I. Misconduct Prohibited by the Constitution
A. Arrest Without Probable Cause
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th
Cir. 1965); Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963).
B. Murder, Beatings, Torture, Coerced Confession
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d
571 (8th Cir. 1968); Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961);
Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1957).
C. Refusal of Medical Care to Persons Beaten by Police
Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963).
D. Discriminatory Prosecution
Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States
v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967); Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89 (2d
Cir. 1963).
E. Illegal Search and Invasion of Privacy
Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); Lucero v. Donovan, 354
F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965); York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963).
F. False Imprisonment
Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969).
G. Denial of Access to Friends and Counsel
Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965).
H. Denial of Police Protection-First Amendment
Wolin v. Port Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968); Cottonreader v. Johnson,
252 F. Supp. 492 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Hurwitt v. Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995
(N.D. Cal. 1965).
I. Denial of Police Protection-Equal Protection
Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1951); Catlette v. United States,
132 F.2d 902, 907 (4th Cir. 1943); Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864
(N.D. Ill. 1967).
II. Federal Civil Rights Act
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) authorizes damages or injunctive relief against vio-
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However, the current magnitude of police discrimination against the
Black community warrants more drastic action than these available remedies. 22 A feasible legal answer to the problem of police discrimination against
the Black community is mandatory injunctive relief through a class action. To date, only one case has been found which joins an entire minority
community in a class action to seek such injunctive relief. 23 This case is

IlH.

lation by state officials of any conceivable constitutional right. "Georgia v.
Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 790 n.13 (1966). As Rep. Dawes said in supporting
its enactment:
"The rights, privileges, and immunities of the American citizen, secured
to him under the Constitution of the United States, are the subjectmatter of this bill. They are not defined in it, and there is no attempt in
it to put limitations upon any of them; but whatever they are, however
broad or important, however minute or small, however estimated by the
American citizen himself, or by his Legislature, they are in this law."
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1871).
B. Municipalities and Other Public Entities May Be Sued for Injunctive Relief
United States v. Holmes County, 385 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1967); Adams v.
Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 1961).
C. Availability of Damages
Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1968); Rhoads v. Horvat, 270
F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967).
D. Availability Against Federal Officers
Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414-15 nn. 13 & 14 (1968); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964).
E. Application to Private Persons
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966).
Possible State Remedies for Police Misconduct
A. Potential Liability of Government Employer
The following states acknowledge municipal liability in one or another
form: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Utah, and Washington. See Van Alstyne,
Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, ILL. LAw FORUM 919
(1966).
B. Negligence Liability of Police Officials for Hiring or Maintaining Officers Whom They Knew, or Should Have Known, to Be Dangerous and
Unfit. Fernelius v. Pierce, 22 Cal. 2d 226, 138 P.2d 12 (1943). Query:
Can a Section 1983 litigation against police be based on this type of theory? See Roberts v. Williams, 302 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Sanberg v. Daley, 306 F. Supp. 277 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Negligence, in this situation can be based only upon a duty to fire (or not to hire) the officer,
and a breach of that duty.
C. Prosecutor's Policy of Refusal to Prosecute May Constitute Civil or Criminal Nonfeasance
See, e.g., State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 96 A.2d 63 (1953); State v. Wymore,
345 Mo. 169, 132 S.W.2d 979 (1939).
D. Challenging Unconstitutional or Otherwise Unlawful Police Practices by
State Taxpayer Suits. All police activity involves expenditure of public
funds, whether for the payment of salaries or purchase of new equipment.
To the extent that police activities are unconstitutional they involve waste
of public funds which a state taxpayer" has standing to challenge. Wirin
v. Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 313 P.2d 844 (1957) ("It is immaterial that the
amount of the illegal expenditures . . . actually permit a saving of tax

funds." Id. at 894, 313 P.2d at 846) and cases there cited. A taxpayer's
suit may be maintained even by a plaintiff who has another and more
direct interest. Herr v. Rudolf, 75 N:D. 91, 25 N.W.2d 916 (1947).
22 See discussion of the problem and the difficulties of documentation, supra
section I.
23 While there have been successful class actions which join large segments of the
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Ennis v. Los Angeles Police Department.24 The size and character of the
class, as a specific segment of a metropolitan population, makes Ennis
unique. Moreover, the lack of judicial precedent to guide the bar or the
courts emphasizes the importance of the Ennis case.
Although the class action for injunctive relief is considered to be the
best legal alternative for the Black comklainant, problems are seen to
arise in such a suit.25 An analysis of the Ennis case will elucidate the
legal problems which are entailed in a class action of this type. Ennis
will be critically examined in order to determine whether the particular
form of class action it involves does, in fact, offer the best legal answer to
the problem.
The Ennis case has two primary objectives: to obtain court recognition
that police discrimination does exist, and to force the appropriate agencies to effectively remedy the situation. In the past, the courts have been
reluctant to recognize facts of social and political life which were depriving
citizens of their civil rights. 26 Although this recognition has been accelerated since the 1950's, any observation as to their position in the future,
specifically in regard to actions against police departments, would be mere
speculation. The problem then becomes a matter of finding an effective
remedy. In order to achieve these objectives, major legal changes are required in the present Ennis format if it is to serve as a viable model for
future successful class actions.

2. Ennis: The Class Action-Problems and Proposed Solutions 27
In a class action as novel and of so large a scale as that involved in the
Ennis case, several areas are determinative of success. These crucial
problem areas involve the decision of who shall be in the class, notice to
those members of the class of the pending action and the determination
of which parties shall be named as defendants. As the present posture of
the case now rests, serious legal issues are raised. The Ennis case joined
the entire Black community of Los Angeles into one class. 28 Notice was
population, most notably Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966), the entire
Black minority of an urban area has not previously been joined into one class action to
seek redress of civil rights, let alone to obtain relief from widespread police discrimination. See also Schnell v. Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir, 1969).
24 No. 68-1763-R (C.D. Cal. filed March 1, 1968).
25 "Legal alternative" refers solely to remedies available through the judiciary.
26 See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(legalized diserlimination for
more than five decades under the slogan "separate but equal"). Use of racial barriers
is legendary. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1875); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 16 U.S. 393 (1856).
27 A preliminary problem to a class action is the question of jurisdiction.
42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1964) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964) provides such jurisdiction.
28 The Ennis case presented formidable problems since many "militant" organization members were joined seeking injunctive relief to prevent discrimination against the
Black community. However, it was successfully argued that such activist organiza-
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effected through publication in leading metropolitan newspapers informing
Black citizens who desired to be excluded from the suit that they must contact the appropriate agencies. Further, Ennis joined the police department
and the police chief as party defendants.2 9 Modification of the present
Ennis format is imperative for the attainment of the sought injunctive relief.
a)

Who is in the Class?

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 provides the jurisdictional basis for a
class action. The first question is: who should be joined in the class?3 0
The obvious answer is to join all those into the class who are subject to
police discrimination and intimidation. In Ennis, for example, this meant
the entire Black community of Los Angeles.
The problems with so large a class are twofold. First, the practitioner
is presented with seemingly insurmountable obstacles. He must find witnesses and collect evidence which demonstrate a "systematic pattern" of
discrimination against an entire segment of the urban community. Monetary deficiency hampers the production of an effective work product.
Moreover, the problems involved in adequately canvassing a population
of several million for evidence are numerous. In order to depose, interrogate, and generally represent the Black population of any urban center,
large sums of money, heretofore unavailable, would be necessary. Since
the class is composed of hundreds of thousands of persons, adequate legal
representation would require a vast armada of experienced attorneys and
secretaries. The authors are unaware of the existence of any fund large
enough to finance such an action.
The second problem arising is whether the Black community can be
properly joined in one class. There was an argument advanced in the early
stages of the Ennis case that since different plaintiffs claimed violations of
different constitutional rights, the Black community could not be joined
into a class because the grounds alleged would therefore not be common
to all members of the class. This contention ignores the very thrust of
the complaint. The plaintiffs are not claiming the violation of several spetions were not representative of the entire Black community. Those organizations were
thus deleted as party plaintiffs in favor of Ennis. Still, Ennis seeks the same relief for
the same broad class.
29 The trial court dismissed the action against the police commission and city
council. This decision is pending on appeal and therefore specific comment regarding
such appeal will not be made.
even if it has taken effect or is threatened only as
30 A class action is proper "...
to one or a few members of the class, provided it is based on grounds which have general application to the class." Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of
Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, Advisory Committee's Notes, 34

F.R.D. 325, 390 (1964).
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cific rights but rather assert the existence of one wrong against the entire
class, a systematic pattern of police malpractice directed against Black
citizens. 3 ' It is important to note that such a class action is really based
upon a new specie of wrong (i.e. police discrimination) which is further
defined in terms of other numerous wrongs. Therefore, the requirements of a
class action are met when it is alleged that a series of events or transactions are generated by a systematic pattern of conduct.
b) Notice to the Class
There is a substantial problem of notification to a class as large as the
entire Black community of Los Angeles. 32 The court, correctly under the
circumstances, entered an order in the Ennis case "requiring certain publication of notice in the Los Angeles Times, the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, the Los Angeles Sentinel and the Los Angeles Herald-Dispatch."a3
It is recognized that personal in-hand service or even service by certified
mail would pose impossible problems. As stated, the members of the
class were notified through newspapers that the court would thus exclude anyone from the class upon request. The judgment would include all members who did not request exclusion. The court found that such notice was
legally sufficient pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.34
31 See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1965) where the court
stated:
The District Court said that the complaint improperly attempted to hold the six
county registrars jointly liable for what amounted to nothing more than individual torts committed by them separately with reference to separate applicants.
For this reason apparently it would have held venue improper as to the three
registrars who lived outside the Southern District of Mississippi and a fourth who
lived in a different division of the Southern District, and it would have ordered that
each of the other two registrars be sued alone. But the complaint charged that
the registrars had acted and were continuing to act as part of a state-wide system
designed to enforce the registration laws in a way that would inevitably deprive
colored people of the right to vote solely because of their color (emphasis added).
See also Contract Buyer's League v. F & F Investment, 48 F.R.D. 7, 11 (N.D. Ill.
1969) where the court stated, ". . . the inequity of any particular contract is the result
of a greater scheme of exploitation involving, among other factors, the contracts executed by the other plaintiffs."
32 Approximately 780,000 Blacks populated Los Angeles County in 1967. Commission on Human Relations, L.A. County Racial and Population Estimates by HRC Areas
(Oct. 1967).
33 Court order entered by the Honorable Manuel L Real, Judge, United States District Court, on January 5, 1970 to publish the following notice in certain Los Angeles
newspapers, from January 5 through February 5, with 3/4-inch headings:
ATTENTION: ALL NEGRO (BLACK) RESIDENTS OF LOS ANGELES
COUNTY-PLEASE TAKE NOTICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT IN FEDERAL
COURT ....
(G) If you do not request exclusion, you will be included in the class of plaintiffs
represented by the aforesaid attorneys. If you wish, however, you may retain
your own attorney to represent your interests.
34 See Johnson v. Robinson, 296 F. Supp. 1165, 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (coverage
of the suit by the news media was sufficient notice to the class). See also Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 569 (2d Cir. 1968).
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This procedure raises several complex questions in regard to the doctrine of res judicata. Specifically, there are at least three distinct possibilities. First, where a party has actually read the notice; second, where a
party has explicitly excluded himself from the class; and third, where a
party alleges never to have read the notice yet wishes to take advantage of
the court's judgment. In the first instance, where a party has read the
notice and is either a named party plaintiff or an absentee member of the
class, 3 5 the judgment is clearly res judicata and bars any subsequent action.36
In the second example, where a party has actually excluded himself from
the class, there may be even more complex problems. Briefly, where the doctrine of mutuality is recognized this party may not use the judgment in a
subsequent action. 37 In jurisdictions which do not follow the mutuality
doctrine,33 a party who excluded himself from the original action could theoretically utilize the judgment at a later time.39 It seems that this party
would not be able to use the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a subsequent
proceeding since Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (3)40 was never intended to permit such a result. To allow a person to exclude himself today
and include himself tomorrow would make a mockery of the 23(b) (3) rule.
The third situation is the most difficult to resolve. Here, the absentee alleges
never to have read the notice nor known of the action. Theoretically, this individual would still be a member of the class because he never excluded himself. The issue then becomes whether this person should be barred from
bringing a subsequent action if the class loses based on the allegation that
he already had his "day in court". Any determination of the res judicata
effect can be tested only in a subsequent action. The problem seems to
be one of balancing this individual's right to due process (denial of "day
(3), namely, to provide
in court") as opposed to the intent of Rule 23(b)
41
him with due process of law in the original action.
35 An absentee member of the class is one who is not specifically named in the
pleadings, yet is a party to the action.
36 See F. JAMEs, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 585 (1965).
37 The doctrine of mutuality will not permit a party to the second suit to claim that
his opponent is bound by an issue litigated in a prior suit unless such party would also
be bound had the decision of such issue gone the other way. Note, Revised Federal Rule
23, Class Actions: Surviving Difficulties and New Problems Require Further Amendment, 52 MINN. L. REV. 509, 525 n.70 (1967).
38 Two leading states which have repudiated the mutuality doctrine are New York
and California. See Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942);
Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
39 See 47 F.R.D. 169, 180-81 (1969).
40 This rule requires as prerequisites to maintenance of any class action that the
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a' class action is superior to
other available rhethods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
41 47 F.R.D. 169, 180-81 (1969). See Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions
Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REV. 629, 652-54 (1965). Note, Revised Federal Rule 23,
supra note 56, at 524-27.
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The contentions of the defense on the issue of notice through newspaper
publication are worthy of consideration here. The defendants indicated that
some members of the class may be illiterate, while those who are literate
may never read the "legal notice" section of the newspaper. Thus, the illiterate group must either be contacted through the broadcast media, through
personal service, or not at all. As far as the literate members of the class
were concerned, defense contended that written notice to every Black person residing in Los Angeles would be the best notice. Furthermore, it was
urged that those persons who desire to be bound should give written response by affidavit. It was also contended that because the plaintiffs claimed
to be representative of the interests of all Blacks in Los Angeles a positive
showing that notice was received was required.

The defense argument continued that in order to insure adequate notification, the plaintiffs should be required to use the broadcast news media of
radio as well as newspaper publication. Furthermore, the defendants maintained that. prime or near prime time on the broadcast media should be
used for such purposes whenever available. Notwithstanding the foregoing arguments, case authority was cited for the proposition that written
notice by certified mail should be ordered by the court and given to all
members of the class. 42
It should be noted that while the defense arguments are persuasive, the
cost of notification to the entire Black community by certified mail 48 or
by television and radio coverage are impracticable at best.
c)

Proposed Solution

The problems of dealing with so large a class and of providing adequate
notice to such a class present formidable obstacles. The decision of the
Ennis court to allow newspaper publication of notice may be legally
proper under the circumstances, yet it fails to answer relevant criticisms outlined above. The problems inherent in representing such a large clas'
and of de jure and de facto notice are not satisfactorily answered by the
Ennis approach.
The approach which should be employed is explained by reference
to Lankford v. Gelston.44 The problem in Lankford was that of harassment of Black families by illegal searches of their homes conducted by
the Baltimore Police Department.

Instead of bringing a class action

on behalf of the entire Black community of Baltimore, as Ennis would
suggest, the plaintiffs narrowed their plea for injunctive relief to a spe42
43

Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd.of Educ., 298 F. Supp. 210 (D. Conn. 1968).
The minimum cost would be $234,000.00 plus 60 per oz. postage (780,000 Blacks

multiplied by 300 cost of a certified letter).
44 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
Lankford succeeded in enjoining the police commissioner, thereby enjoining police misconduct and discrimination in Baltimore.
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cific segment of the Black population. In Lankford the plaintiffs were
families of whom 300 had been the subject of alleged police misconduct.
Therefore, the Lankford case, by narrowing its complaint to 300 families succeeded in providing legal recourse for the entire Black population of Baltimore from such illegal searches by police in the future. The
important point here is that by limiting the members of the class to a
specific area, for example a relatively small geographic area in the Los
Angeles ghetto community, the Ennis action or any similar action would
resolve the very practical and formidable problems of whom to specifically
join in the class and how to effectuate notice to all of the parties concerned. The use of geographic boundaries would sufficiently reduce costs
and thereby allow a class to affirmatively show that all members had been
notified pf the action by certified mail.45 In addition, the problem of being able to finance and staff the taking of depositions, interrogatories and
other necessary pre-trial preparations would become comparatively less difficult. The most important assurance which this solution provides is that although only a small segment of the community would be represented, in a
de facto sense the entire Black community would be protected. This is so
since non-parties would be able to avail themselves of the court's decision
and would, in all likelihood, benefit from the original injunction against
the proper agencies.
A word of caution may be necessary here. It is not the intent of the
authors to imply that non-parties could use the judgment in a subsequent
action. The basis of a solution to the problem lies in ending police harassment of Black citizens. Lankford v. Gelston4 6 proposed a solution
through mandatory injunctive relief. The Ennis court could expand the
Lankford-type injunction by forcing the police department to submit an
extensive program which would prevent future violations of the class's
rights. Although, in a technical sense, only the members of the class will
- benefit, in a de facto sense the program will reach every Black citizen in
the community. The use of the Lankford method in an Ennis-type class
action would -hopefully force the party defendants to provide an effective
plan to end police harassment. Simply stated, a program would be required to effectively curb police harassment against the members of the
class. 'Such a program would, of course, be subject to judicial approval
and would be, submitted within time limits made explicit by the court.
Again, as in Lankford, the court order would technically protect only
those Blacks who were members of the class. However, the vast changes
which would occur through the police proposal would not be limited to the
class. Instead, all Black citizens would benefit from the original injunction.
45
46

Cf. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 298 F. Supp. 210 (D. Conn. 1968).
364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
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Whom to Sue

The resolution of the question of whom to sue is vital to the success of
a class action directed against police discrimination. 4 7 First, which parties, when enjoined, would have the power and the resources to effectively
serve the court order? Second, it must be discovered if some or all of
those entities to be enjoined are immune from the injunctive process
within the federal court system.
1. The Police Department
The most obvious party to join in the suit is the police department.
This agency is directly responsible for the harassment and intimidation
against the class. Is the police department, however, immune from such
a suit?
In general, it is a rule of law that a

"

.

. .

public official is immune

from civil suit based upon discretionary acts performed within the scope of
his authority, regardless of the motives with which he performs his duties
.

..,

".

It has been further stated that

".

this immunity is not abro-

gated by civil rights statutes" 49 , and that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided
by statute, a public employee is not liable for injury resulting from his act
or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of
discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused."5 0
It should be noted that federal courts will follow the doctrine of immunity unless it offends the Federal Constitution.5 ' This mandate becomes specifically directed to the class action situation under discussion
here. It is arguable that pursuant to the Court's decisions in Egan v. City of
47 An action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) must be confined to state officials
whereas suit under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964) would cover federal officers. Norton v.
McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965); Gregoire
v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). See also
2 EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN, PoLmcAL AND CmL RIGHTS IN THE UNrrI STATES
1072-86 (Stud. ed. 1967).
48 Selico v. Jackson, 201 F. Supp. 475, 478 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
49 Id. See also CAL. GovT. CODE § 820.2 (West 1966). But see Scruggs v. Haynes,
252 Cal. App. 2d 256, 262-68, 60 Cal. Rptr. 355, 359-63 (1967) (section 820.2 does
not grant immunity to a police officer even in a suit for damages where unreasonable
force was used).
50 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1966).
51 Corbean v. Board of Educ., 366 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1041 (1967). This principle was firmly established in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), where the Court held that a plaintiff may sue a state official for injunctive
relief where he can show that such official was acting contrary to the Constitution.
"The theory is that although the defendant official is not truly a private person, the
unconstitutionality of his action removes the extension of sovereign immunity. Thus,
it is sometimes said that his unconstitutional act strips him of official character and so
of his immunity." Dibble, Syllabus for Constitutional Law 47 (unpublished, 1969-70).
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Aurora52 and Monroe v. Pape,53 a municipality is not within the ambit of 42
U.S.C. section 1983 and is not a "person" within the meaning of that
statute. If this rule were to be applied in a suit to enjoin the police depart-

ment, a court could, on the basis of Egan and Monroe, dismiss such an action
based upon the doctrine of immunity. However, upon closer examination,
these general contentions of immunity have no basis. The Court in both
cases was concerned with suits for damages and not with injunctive relief.

In the case of alleged police discrimination against the Black community, there is an entirely different factual problem. 54 Three reasons strongly
indicate that the police department should not be immune from suit.

First, there should be no doctrine of immunity because such a doctrine
is not applicable to suits for injunctive relief. This was the position taken
in United States v. Clark55 where the court stated:
This doctrine of "judicial immunity" is a sound one and ingrained in the substantive law of both the Federal and State courts .... The Federal courts have
applied it to numerous Federal officials. However, such a doctrine of judicial
imnunity applies only when those officials are faced with civil suits for damages
in connection with the performance of their official duties. The doctrine has no
application where, as here, the relief sought is preventive .... The principle that
no State official-regardless of his position-is immune from having his conduct
challenged-in the form of a preventive action-is well established.5 6

Second, where persons are subjected to a deprivation of their constitutional rights because officials are acting beyond the scope of their authority, the doctrine of immunity is inapplicable.57

Third, the doctrine of

state immunity cannot be permitted to interfere with federally protected
rights.

Otherwise, protection of section 1983 rights might be easily cir-

cumvented in many states.58

Consequently, the police department may

365 U.S. 167 (1961).
53 365 U.S. 514 (1961).
54 Randall v. Newark Housing Auth., 266 F. Supp. 171 (D.N.J.), rev'd 384 F.2d
151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968) involved a claim for injunctive
relief by tenants, and distinguished Monroe on that basis.
55 249 F.Supp. 720 (S.D. Ala. 1965).
56 Id. at 727.
57 The police are sought to be enjoined in the Ennis class action not for discretionary acts but for blatantly lawless conduct of a sort which has never been protected. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967), where the court stated "The
common law has never granted police officers an absolute and unqualified immunity.
52

58 In Beauregard v. Wingard, 230 F. Supp. 167, 173-74 (S.D. Cal. 1964) the court
stated
In cases involving civil rights, California cases stating California public policy
as to immunity for California law enforcement officers, do not govern; we must
turn to federal cases. And likewise, we are not precluded by federal cases based
on diversity of citizenship; nor can we regard federal cases concerning federal
law enforcement officers as controlling, for such officers, acting as such, are not
included within the phrase 'under color of' state law, and a suit for violation of
civil rights under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 may not be brought against them.
And in Robichaud v. Roman, 351 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1965) the court stated,
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be joined as a party defendant to the class action. 50
2.

The Police Chief

The police chief is an important party to join in the suit as his power
includes the supervision, control, regulation, and management of the department plus the extensive power to make and enforce all rules "necessary and desireable" to the operation of the department.0 0

It is thus

clear that the police chief is a proper and necessary party in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Is he immune from suit? The answer is
in the negative. Any party which exerts substantial control over the police department is properly enjoinable in such a class action. The police
chief does not have the benefit of the immunity doctrine for if injunctive
relief were aimed at and binding upon individual officers and not upon the
chief, the decree would be ineffective. 61
3.

The Police Commission

Still another vital party to the suit is the police commission or, where
no such commission exists, that governmental agency responsible for the
de jure and de facto management and control of the police department.
Most city charters, including that of Los Angeles, enumerate the division
of powers within the police departmental structure. In Los Angeles, the
police commission is explicitly charged with controlling and managing
the police department. 62 Moreover, it is obligated by the charter to determine that complaints of police malpractice and misconduct are properly investigated and adjudicated. Therefore, the commission is the sole
agency which has the power and the duty to deter or prevent police discrimination against the Black community. Consequently, since the commission is, so to speak, "where the buck stops", it must be joined in the
class action.
Nonetheless, it has been maintained that the police commission should
"[If immunities are broadly granted to state officers without consideration of the
nature of their alleged misdeeds ... the statute [42 U.S.C. § 1983] becomes subject to
circumvention, if not emasculation."
59 See Schnell v. Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Lucero v. Donovan, 354
F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965); Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963); York
v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963); Houser v. Hill, 278 F. Supp. 920 (M.D. Ala.
1968); Cottonreader v. Johnson, 252 F. Supp. 492 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
60 Los ANGELES CiTY CHARTEa, art. VI, § 78 and art. XIX, §§ 198-201.
61 "The test as to whether a superior official can be dispensed with as a party was
stated to be whether 'the decree which is entered will effectively grant the relief desired
by expending itself on the subordinate official who is before the court."' Hynes v.
Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86, 96 (1949), quoting from Williams v. Fanning, 332
U.S. 490, 494 (1947).
62 Los ANGELES CrrY CHARTER, Art. VI, §§ 70, 78, 79. See also Report by the
Governor's Commission on L.A. Riots 30 (1965).
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be immune because of the distant connection between the commission and
63
This reathe alleged acts of discrimination by the police department.
soning is weak. The police commission is the agency directly responsible
for the police operation.6 4 That responsibility implies a clear proximity
of the commission to the department and, by itself, provides a legally sufficient basis for a claim against the police commission. 6 5
It seems, then, that the police commission cannot avail itself of immunity on the grounds of its "distance" from departmental action. Moreover, any state official or entity is enjoinable under the Fourteenth
Amendment's proscription of state action contrary to the due process
clause. 66 Consequently, if a city or public entity is enjoinable under the
Fourteenth Amendment, it seems bizarre to contend, as does the defense
in Ennis, that the police commission is not enjoinable under statutes intended to protect persons against deprivation of rights secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 67 Further, "The concept of federalism: i.e.,
federal respect for state institutions, will not be permitted to shield an invasion of the citizen's constitutional rights."168 It has been decided that
this principle of federalism will not shield ". . . the activities of the executive
and judicial branches of the state from interdiction when constitutional
rights are involved."(6 9 Therefore, it is apparent that there is no obvious legal
justification for imposing the doctrine of immunity as a bar to a class action
suit against the police commission. A fortiori, the authorities cited above
indicate that the courts should, in fact, require the inclusion of the police
commission in such a class action.
It is now apparent that the class action must include, to be effective, a
three-pronged attack aimed at enjoining the agencies charged with the
power of management and control of the police force. These three are
the police department itself, the police chief and the police commission.
It has been shown that none of these entities should or do have immunity
from an action involving the constitutional infringement of the class's
rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
C.

Conclusion-TheModified Ennis Class Action

The underlying purpose of the Ennis case is to stop the unconstitutional
deprivation of the rights of Black citizens by the police department.
63 See Brief for Defendant [City Attorney's Office of Los Angeles], Ennis v.
L.A.P.D., No. 68-1763-R (C.D. Cal. filed March 1, 1968).
64 Los ANGELES CITY CHARTER, art. VI, §§ 70, 78, 79.
65 Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 205 n.9 (1966).
66 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
67 The classic example, as far as this discussion is concerned, is 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(1964).
68 Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597, 601 (4th Cir. 1963).
09 Id. at 601, referring to Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
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However, the Ennis injunction does not seek to make the courts a super
police review board. Rather, it seeks to direct the proper agencies to propose an effective plan to curb police misconduct and discrimination and
to offer an effective program of redress for aggrieved Black citizens.
After a careful review of the facts, it is contended that the use of police
boards is not effective to combat the problem. Individual suits ignore the
central issue and concentrate on redress of individual grievances. It is
the class action, when limited, which offers the most viable legal answer
for the entire Black community.
However, while the injunctive relief sought may accomplish some of the
goals mentioned above, it is reminiscent of the type of injunctive order in
Brown v. Board of Education.70 That decision, handed down in 1955
required "all deliberate speed". 71 However, some fifteen years later this
well-known case still leaves the problem unsolved. What can be done to
avoid a repetition of the unsatisfactory Brown results? 72 Since there are
numerous complex difficulties inherent in a judicial disposition of the
problem of police discrimination, it is important to examine the legislative
branch for a possible supplementary solution.
III.

A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION

The modifications of the Ennis model should insure a fair chance of
future success in other class actions. However, our system of separation
of powers expressly reserves certain powers to other branches of the government. Therefore, it is suggested that a program to effectively deter police discrimination against racial minorities and to provide speedy redress
of complaints must emanate from the legislative branches of our cities
and states and not from the courts.
It must be noted that the class action injunction will provide desperately
needed relief. However, this relief should be only supplementary to major legislative innovations and revisions of the current police structure.
The problem which our city and state legislative agencies must solve is
police brutality, harassment, and intimidation aimed at the Black community. The impotence of police review boards serves only to amplify
the mood of distrust and tension in our nation's cities. Individual suits
brought by Black complainants do not alter this situation. Instead, they
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Id. at 301.
72 The specific manner in which the Brown results could be avoided is generally beyond the scope of this comment. However, one method which could be employed was
suggested. The court could order the party defendants to submit a program to curb
police harassment by a definite date. Failure to observe court imposed deadlines would
result in the imposition of penalties. Such penalties could include, for example, the
issuance of a contempt order.
70

71
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ignore the community problem for the sake of individual complainants.
Finally, the class action, even when modified to create ultimate effectiveness, may not provide sufficient impetus for change. Any solution must
entail the creation in the Black community of a climate of trust and con-

fidence in the police force by effectively deterring police malpractice against
racial minorities. The most effective way to attack this problem is by the
abolition of the present hierarchical structure of city and county police organizations and the creation of community controlled police departments.
In almost every American metropolis, the police no longer are under civilian control-that is to say, democratic public control. Whether it be constant harassment
of black youth in Los Angeles and white youth in Washington, brutal repression of
white dissidents in Chicago ... refusal to obey the orders of a black mayor in
Cleveland and those of a white president of the Board of Education in Philadelphia, or failure to answer routine calls for assistance from black neighborhoods
of Detroit and white neighborhoods of Baltimore, it is clear that there are many
not believe they can make the police
people in the metropolitan areas who do
73
respond to their needs. (emphasis added)

In order to create a situation where police are safe in our cities, where
the inhabitants of those cities have faith in the police, and where citizens
are secure in the knowledge that police harassment will be dealt with
fairly and firmly, neighborhood police departments must be created. As
one Black resident of Watts said:
The police is brainwashed that every colored person is a criminal. In the old days
the police were better. They were on the beat and the parents cooperated good
with the police. The police would come to the house and talk to the kids if they
did something bad. Now they just talk to you on the phone, and the kids hate
them and they got no respect for them. The police used to have band groups and
boy and girl clubs but they stopped all that. Now they just give out tickets and
of the reasons we had the trouble here. [referring to
arrest you. That's 7 one
4
the 1965 Watts riot]

Specifically, community departments would be designated by geographic boundaries within each city. These neighborhood police agencies would be financially independent.7 5 This would foster a fundamental change of attitude in police-community relations; the police
would, out of necessity, become responsive to the needs of the neighbor73 Waskow, Community Control of the Police, TRANs-ACTION MAGAZINE, December,
PRELUDE TO RIOT, 1-60 (Vintage 1967).
74 P. JACOBS, supra note 4, at 60. A return to the "old days", while seemingly a
desirable panacea, is virtually impossible. The fear and racial tension which now are
present in every city have progressed too far to allow a proverbial turning back of the
clock. Furthermore, the bureaucratic complexities of modem police structure would
seem to eliminate any chance of returning to the "good old days".
75 Existing funds would be apportioned among each community according to population and crime rate statistics. Since massive reorganization would require additional
sums of money, new sources would have to be found. The general tax coffers, federal-state-community grants, and novel methods of revenue collection would have to
be sought.

1969, at 4. See also P. JACOBS,
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hood they served. A strong emphasis would be placed upon recruiting
policemen from the very neighborhood with which they were to deal.
Consequently, many officers would have an understanding of local needs
and conflicts and would be able to resolve these problems with the least
amount of friction.
Each community would elect a civilian board of police commissioners
to staggered terms of office. 76 This board would be elected by popular
vote and would have a two-fold responsibility. First, to oversee and
generally direct the neighborhood police chief and second, to form a civilian review board to deal with community complaints.
Each board of commissioners would be responsible for appointing highlevel police officers. This function could be done with the approval of
the mayor, a metropolitan headquarters, or any legislative agent. The
commission would have the power to hire and discipline individual officers. Further, the board would set policy decisions and control the establishment of law enforcement priorities. 77 Therefore, by exerting control over policy and a disciplinary power over officers the community
could, by their votes, exert a strong check over police malpractice.
To assure speedy redress of grievances, each board of commissioners
would sit as a review board to hear citizen complaints. Unlike present review structures which have no inherent power to deal effectively with such
complaints, these review boards would have the power to suspend, fine
and expel police officers found to be guilty of proscribed offenses against
the community. Each hearing would afford both parties the same rights
they would have before any court. Decisions of the board could be appealed to a regional board composed of select commissioners from each community. In this way the review board could effectively deal with citizen
complaints.
The concept of community control has raised two primary objections.
First, it has been argued that differences in styles of law enforcement
might plague the individual as he moved from one area to another. Second, problems of "hot pursuit" from one commission's jurisdiction to another would frequently arise. However, it has been shown that these
problems are really illusory. "[A]lready, in a city like Washington where
U.S. park police, capitol police, White House police and metropolitan police have major geographically distinct jurisdictions within the District of
Columbia, solutions for 'hot pursuit' and similar problems [arising from
76 Terms of office would be similar to the system used by the United States Senate.
A portion of the board would remain in office while another segment would be newly
elected. The purpose of this process would assure the presence of experienced members
alongside freshman commissioners. However, unlike the congressional seniority system, each commissioner's power would be no greater than any other.
77 See also Waskow, Community Control of the Police, supra note 73, at 4.
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78
different styles in law enforcement] have been worked out."
It should be further noted that neighborhood controls need not destroy
city-wide institutions. Criminology, fingerprint, modus operandi files and
many "white collar" crimes could still be effectively dealt with by metropolitan agencies. However, community-elected commissioners would be the
overseers and not an impersonal police-establishment complex.
It is important to note that these reforms are intended to provide a general
foundation for proposed legislation. It is the concept of a law enforcement agency directly controlled by the citizenry that is critical to this
discussion. The primary reason for such a radical concept as communitycontrolled police lies in the belief that only such a program will effectively control police malpractice and will foster an attitude of mutual cooperation and dependence between the police establishment and the Black
people.

Richard A. Stambul
Jeffrey M. Wilson

78

Id. at 5.

